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11 Introduction
The adoption of an inﬂation targeting regime (IT from now on) as a monetary policy
framework since the early 90’s by an increasing number of central banks has spurred
research on the beneﬁts of such policy scheme1. Theoretical work suggests that the sound
implementation of an IT regime delivers “optimal” equilibrium, in the sense of anchoring
inﬂation around a target with relatively low inﬂation and, if “ﬂexible”, low output volatility2.
However, whether IT has led to a superior monetary policy performance or has induced
macroeconomic beneﬁts in the countries that adopted it (ITers henceforth) is deﬁnitely an
empirical matter.
A fundamental element to be taken into account in any empirical work is the appropriate
success measure. From the onset, we make a distinction between relative and absolute
success criteria. Absolute criteria refer to a type of policy evaluation that accounts gains in
macroeconomic outcomes without reference to alternative policies that might have achieved
the same outcomes. Relative criteria, on the other side, evaluate a particular policy framework
in comparison to others to asses whether the former is superior.
The verdict of the absolute criteria about IT success is overwhelmingly one3: “IT has been
beneﬁcial”. To our knowledge, there is no empirical work that has found that IT has delivered
worse outcomes in comparison to pre-adoption ones4. On the other hand, the relative criteria
have not yet yielded a clear-cut conclusion. This approach would attempt to answer questions
like does inﬂation targeting make a diﬀerence? or does inﬂation targeting matter? From a
policy evaluation view, this is the relevant criteria at which we need to look.
Our goal is to evaluate the behavior of inﬂation dynamics brought about by the adoption of
IT. We do so by studying three measures that distinguish inﬂation dynamics: mean, variance
and persistence. Key interesting questions emerge from the study of these measures.
First, IT has been adopted by countries either to credibly disinﬂate (or converge) or, as
asserted by some authors, to lock-in the gains obtained from episodes of disinﬂation. Would
countries had done better or worse had they adopted any other regime?
Second, it is generally stated that inﬂation uncertainty results from factors exogenous to the
scope of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (terms of trade or supply shocks,
for instance) as well as from monetary policy shocks. In this sense, inﬂation can be made less
uncertain up to the limits set out by the amount of exogenous uncertainty. The reduction of
endogenous uncertainty arises from increasing the signal-to-noise ratios of central bank policy
1 To date, twenty one countries follow an explicit IT framework and there are some countries that are
considering its adoption. See for example Truman (2003) and P´ etursson (2004).
2 See for example Svensson (2000).
3 See for Bernanke et al. (1999), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) and Corbo et al. (2002).
4 See Neumann and Von Hagen (2002) for a recent empirical survey.
2instruments. Modern monetary policy practice, not exclusively IT, hinges precisely on making
monetary policy more predictable. Once again, a fair question for a country that adopted IT
is whether inﬂation uncertainty has fallen more or less in comparison to the counterfactual
situation of not having adopted IT.
Last, the theory of IT emphasizes that the overall features of the framework are built upon
the pillar of credibility. Credibility is understood as the ability the central bank has to anchor
medium to long run expectations, to avoid expectation traps that may render persistently high
or low inﬂation rates. On the other hand, ﬂexible IT implies that shocks that drive inﬂation
away from the target should revert at a pace that does not harm real activity. Hence, the
speed of adjustment seems to depend on the degree of ﬂexibility5. Too fast an adjustment
is equivalent to a strict IT, likely in situations whereby the central bank needs to gain or
strengthen credibility. When the adjustment is slow, a more ﬂexible IT is in place. In the
fast-adjustment case, undue real volatility might emerge whereas in the slow-adjustment case
either credibility is strong enough that the central bank can rip some beneﬁts of ﬂexibility, or
the nominal anchor is lost and the inﬂation falls to the expectation trap.
Hence, either more or less persistence can result from IT adoption. Taking aside any other
shock and focusing just on monetary policy and credibility, a reduction in persistence may
easily be the result for emerging market economies being stricter ITers looking to strengthen
credibility. More persistence can result from successful ﬂexible ITers or unsuccessful ITers not
gaining credibility. Once more, what would the empirical evaluation of IT over persistence
tell us about the adopting ITers?
In recent years, a growing literature has provided insights on the empirical assessment of IT.
Corbo et al. (2002), for instance, compare policies and outcomes in fully-ﬂedged IT countries to
two groups, potential ITers and non-ITers. Among other things, they ﬁnd that sacriﬁce ratios
were lower in ITers, that IT countries have reduced inﬂation forecast errors and that inﬂation
persistence has declined strongly among ITers. Even though the richness in the measures of
macroeconomic outcomes to evaluate and the comparison to a control group, Corbo et al.
(2002) is yet an evaluation under the absolute criteria.
Johnson (2002), by comparing ﬁve ITers to six non-ITers, all of them in industrialized
economies, ﬁnds that the period after the announcement of IT is associated with a statistically
signiﬁcant reduction in the level of expected inﬂation. On the contrary, the paper ﬁnds that
IT has not reduced absolute average forecast errors in targeting countries relative to those in
non-targeting countries. However, ITers did avoid even larger forecast errors than would have
occurred in the absence of IT.
On the other hand, Neumann and Von Hagen (2002) consider a group of six industrial IT
countries and three non-IT countries and perform an event study to quantify the response of
5 See Svensson (1999).
3inﬂation and long-run as well as short-run interest rates to a negative supply shock (increase
in world oil prices6). They ﬁnd that the eﬀect of IT is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for
average inﬂation, but signiﬁcant for both short and long interest rates, meaning that the gain
in inﬂation credibility has been superior in IT countries.
P´ etursson (2004) analyzes a bigger sample (twenty one ITers) that includes developing
economies. He evaluates the performance of a set of macroeconomic outcomes using a dummy
variable for pre and post IT periods on a country basis. His overall ﬁnding is that IT has
indeed been beneﬁcial to reduce average inﬂation, persistence and the variability of inﬂation7.
However, the technique oﬀered by this paper, does not tackle the fundamental question of
relative performance. Its contribution hinges in giving a clear account for the evidence of the
absolute beneﬁts of IT and corroborates previous ﬁndings on this line.
Levin et al. (2004) study inﬂation persistence using ﬁve industrial ITers which are compared to
seven industrial non-ITers. They perform univariate regressions on inﬂation for each country
and ﬁnd that inﬂation persistence is estimated to be quite low within ITers whereas the unit
root hypothesis cannot be rejected for non-ITers. On the other hand, Levin and Piger (2004)
in a similar empirical framework with twelve industrial countries, allow for structural breaks
and ﬁnd that inﬂation in general exhibits low persistence8. Additionally, they suggest that
IT does not seem to have had a large impact on long-term expected inﬂation for a group of
eleven emerging market economies.
Finally, Ball and Sheridan (2005) provide evidence on the irrelevance of IT. They look at
seven OECD countries that adopted IT in the early 90’s and thirteen countries that did not.
They claim that ITers that reduced higher-than-average inﬂation rates towards equilibrium
levels were merely reﬂecting regression to the mean and not a proper eﬀect of IT. Once they
control for regression to the mean, they ﬁnd that there is no evidence that IT improves
macroeconomic performance. In their words, “Just as short people on average have children
who are taller than they are, countries with unusually high and unstable inﬂation tend to see
these problems diminish, regardless of whether they adopt inﬂation targeting”.
In our view, rather than challenging the previous evidence and beliefs about IT eﬀects, the
crucial point of the claim made in Ball and Sheridan (2005) is methodological. If there is
an ITer with poor performance before IT, then it should be compared with a non-ITer with
equally poor initial performance. Otherwise, the targeting eﬀect would be overstated. This is
precisely the reason why this matter of comparability will not be overlooked here.
6 This type of shock creates a dilemma because they are inﬂationary and at the same time generate a
downturn of economic activity. They choose two episodes: 1978-1979 and 1998-1999.
7 There are other studies that provide mixed evidence about inﬂation persistence. Benati (2004) and Levin
et al. (2004) ﬁnd that inﬂation has become less persistent within the OECD and specially IT countries.
8 These results conﬁrm those of Benati (2004) that studies inﬂation dynamics in twenty OECD countries
and Emery (1994) that analyzes the USA postwar inﬂation process.
4Following Neumann and Von Hagen (2002), Johnson (2002) and Ball and Sheridan (2005)
we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator approach to evaluate the eﬀects on key measures
of inﬂation dynamics resulting from IT adoption. As we argue later, the previous studies on
this issue may suﬀer sample selection bias (a few industrialized countries, for instance) and,
importantly, select counterfactuals for the ITers in an arbitrary fashion. Our contribution is
twofold: ﬁrst, we use all the twenty three IT experiences so far and the widest possible control
group of non-ITers (86 countries) using diﬀerent possible dates of IT adoption. With this, we
understand IT as an alternative monetary policy framework worldwide, for both industrialized
and developing economies. Second, given that IT adoption can be interpreted as a natural
experiment, we aim to reestablish the conditions of a randomized experiment and represent
IT adoption as a treatment. This naturally leads us to perform propensity score matching as
an alternative to the widely used regression approach. In a nutshell, we seek to overcome the
aforementioned methodological limitations by letting the data select the controls for ITers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂy describe the propensity
score and matching techniques for evaluation; in section 3 we discuss some empirical issues
regarding the robustness of our results and present the inﬂation outcomes to be evaluated; in
section 4 we show our main ﬁndings and section 5 concludes and provides some avenues for
future research.
2 Methodology
As mentioned, we use microeconometric techniques usually applied in non-experimental
contexts, borrowed from the program evaluation literature. To be consistent with this
literature in this section we may refer to the adoption of IT as treatment, to the ITers as
the treated group and to the non-ITers as the control group.
2.1 The fundamental problem
Let D be a binary indicator that equals unity if a country has adopted IT and zero otherwise.
Also, let Y 1
t denote the value of certain outcome in period t if the country has adopted the
IT regime and Y 0
t if not. Given a set of observable country attributes X, the average eﬀect



















t |X,D = 1

(1)
It is clear from (1) that we face an identiﬁcation problem since E[Y 0
t |X,D = 1] is not
observable. It is convenient to rewrite (1) in a slightly diﬀerent way, closer to what we actually



















This way of representing ξ allows us to exploit the panel data nature of the sample, and hence
to control for ﬁxed factors that could be correlated with the outcomes (i.e. most developed
countries having less volatile inﬂation rates). A common approach to estimate the expectation
E[(Y 0
t −Y 0
t0)|X,D = 1] is to replace it with the observable average outcome in the untreated
state E[(Y 0
t − Y 0
t0)|X,D = 0] and, hence, consider the statistic

















which is known as the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator9.
However, normally E[Y 0
t |X,D = 1] 6= E[Y 0
t |X,D = 0], so (3) will render biased estimates
of ξ from two sources10. The ﬁrst arises from the presence of ITers in the sample that are
not comparable with non-ITers and vice versa. The second is due to diﬀerent distributions of
the X between the treated and the control groups, which is usual in non-randomized samples
(like a dataset of countries). Fortunately, matching methods deal with these shortcomings.
2.2 Matching methods
The idea behind matching techniques is to eliminate the aforementioned biases by pairing
ITers with non-ITers that have similar observed characteristics. The goal is to estimate a
suitable counterfactual for each ITer, to reestablish the conditions of a randomized experiment
(that is, random assignment of the X) when no such data are available. Under these
circumstances, the diﬀerence between the outcome of the treated and that of a matched
counterfactual can be attributed to the treatment eﬀect.
2.2.1 The propensity score
Usually, determining along which dimension to match the countries or what type of weighting
scheme is a diﬃcult task. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) reduce the dimensionality of this
problem by suggesting that the match can be performed on the basis of a single index that
summarizes all the information from the observable covariates. This index, the propensity
score, is the probability of treatment conditional on observable characteristics,
p(X) = E [D|X] = Pr(D = 1|X) (4)




t − Y 0
t )|X,D = 1

= a, ˆ ξdd is equivalent to the least square estimate of a in the
panel equation Yi,t = aDi,t + Xi,tb + ci + dt + i,t . See Johnson (2002) and Ball and Sheridan (2005).
10 See Heckman et al. (1998a).
6and should satisfy the balancing hypothesis, which states that observations with the
same propensity score must have the same distribution of observable and unobservable
characteristics independently of the treatment status, formally D ⊥ X|p(X)11. Hence,
equation (1) can be rewritten as

















The ﬁrst source of bias (non-comparability among ITers and non-ITers) can be eliminated by
only considering countries within the common support, the interval on the real line where both
distributions {p(X)|D = 1} and {p(X)|D = 0} have positive densities. The second source of
bias (diﬀerence in the distribution of the observable variables) is eliminated by reweighing
the non-ITers observations. This is the very goal of matching methods: conditional on X, to
equalize the counterfactual outcome distribution of the non-ITers with the observed outcome
distribution of the non-ITers.
Estimating the propensity score is straightforward, as any probabilistic model suits (4). For
instance, we can adopt the parametric form Pr(Di = 1|Xi) = F(h(Xi)) where F(.) is the
logistic cumulative distribution (i.e. a logit). However, two points are to be handle with
care. First, the estimation requires choosing a set of conditioning variables X that are not
inﬂuenced by the adoption of the IT regime. Otherwise, the matching estimator will not
correctly measure the treatment eﬀect, because it will capture the (endogenous) changes in
the distribution of X induced by the IT adoption. For this reason, the X variables should
measure country attributes before the treatment12. Second, the model selection, i.e. the form
of h(Xi), can be seen as a way of testing the balancing hypothesis. Dehejia and Wahba (2002)
suggest using a polynomial according to the following steps:
• Start with a parsimonious logit speciﬁcation (i.e. h(Xi) linear)
• Stratify all observations on the common support such that estimated propensity scores within a
stratum for treated and control countries are close. For example, start by dividing observations
into strata of equal score range (0 − 0.2,...,0.8 − 1).
• For each interval, test if the averages of X of treated and control units do not diﬀer. If covariates
are balanced between these groups for all strata, the speciﬁcation satisﬁes the balancing
hypothesis13. If the test fails in one interval, divide it into smaller strata and reevaluate.
11 Matching methods rely on the fundamental assumption of conditional independence between outcomes and
the treatment, i.e. {Y 1,Y 0} ⊥ D|X. This assumption states that given X, the non-treated outcomes are
what the treated outcomes would have been had they not been treated (therefore, for each treated we could
in principle ﬁnd a control observation with the same X). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1984) show that if the balancing hypothesis holds, conditioning on p(X) instead preserves this
important condition (i.e. {Y 1,Y 0} ⊥ D|p(X)). In practice, we require a weaker and testable condition to
identify the treatment eﬀect: conditional mean independence, E[Y 0|X,D = 1] = E[Y 0|X,D = 0].
12 However, even these variables could be inﬂuenced by the program through the eﬀects of expectations.
13 Actually, the weaker version of mean conditional independence. See footnote 11.
7• If a covariate is not balanced for many strata, a less parsimonious speciﬁcation of h(Xi) is
needed. This can be achieved by adding interaction and/or higher-order terms of the covariate.
2.2.2 The matched diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator
Given the propensity score, there are various methods available for ﬁnding a counterfactual
for ITer i14. Following Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998a), we can compute a
consistent estimator of the counterfactual by means of a kernel weighted average of outcomes.
This approach not only has good statistical properties but is also a convenient way to work
with a sample of countries, as it could be diﬃcult to ﬁnd an actual non-ITer for each ITer.
Let C denote the set of non-ITers countries whose propensity scores are over the region of the















where K(.) is a kernel function (with bandwidth parameter h) that weights the outcome of
country j inversely proportional to the distance between its propensity score value (pj) and
the one of the non-ITer i (pi).
Having found the matched pairs of ITers and non-ITers, the treatment eﬀect estimator for




























where the pre-treatment outcome Y 0
t0 has been replaced by the time averages of Y 0
i,τ and ˜ Y 0
i,τ
before the treatment15. The estimator (7) has no analytical variance, so standard errors are to
be computed by bootstrapping (i.e. resampling the observations of the control group). Finally,
the average of all possible ˆ ξi,t constitutes an unbiased estimator of (2).
3 Empirical issues
Before presenting the “inﬂation outcomes” to be used in our evaluation, it is convenient to
brieﬂy discuss some issues regarding the dates the various central banks adopted their IT
regime, i.e the period when treatment occurred.
14 See Smith and Todd (2005) for a review and examples.
15 Heckman et al. (1998a) and Smith and Todd (2005) suggest using a weighted average of the pre-treatment
observations instead of a sole observation to control for possible outliers or trend eﬀects. In (7) we have
used a simple average (equal weights).
83.1 Adoption dates
In a number of cases the exact IT adoption timing is unclear: authors and central banks
use diﬀerent criteria. To address this ambiguity and for the sake of robustness, we use two
possible adoption dates for each country16. First, we consider dates when countries started
some form of IT (soft IT), typically by simply announcing numerical targets for inﬂation or
by stating that they were switching to IT. On the other hand, we use dates of fully-ﬂedged
IT adoption, namely, an explicit IT adoption as publicized by central banks and implying
numerical targets for inﬂation together with the absence of nominal anchors other than the
inﬂation target (forecast)17.
Our approach contrasts previous studies as it considers that many developing-country ITers
used a soft version of IT as a strategy to reduce inﬂation from two-digit to international
levels18; once inﬂation reached a stable low level, their central banks would reinforce the
regime, by abandoning other nominal anchors and committing exclusively to target inﬂation.
For example, Chile may appear as an early IT adopter (1991) in other studies but it run
exchange rate regimes not compatible with fully-ﬂedged IT until 1999. For Peru, authors such
as Corbo et al. (2002) use a soft IT adoption date (1994), when the central bank announced an
inﬂation target consistent with a money growth operational target, while Levin et al. (2004)
use its fully-ﬂedged date (2002).
The year of IT adoption for developed economies is less controversial. In New Zealand for
instance, the beginning of IT can be dated as far as 1988 when a numerical target for
inﬂation was announced in the Government budget statement. Or, following Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), 1990 when the ﬁrst Policy Targets Agreement between the Minister
of Finance and the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand was published, specifying
numerical targets for inﬂation and the dates by which they were to be achieved. In 1991,
a target range of 0 to 2 percent for 1993 was announced and since then it has remained
unchanged.
In the case of Sweden, we follow Ball and Sheridan (2005) for our fully-ﬂedged classiﬁcation
given that the ﬁrst announced inﬂation target was 2 for December 1995 even though the
Riksbank announced its shift to IT during 1993. For Canada, the ﬁrst target range was
announced in 1991. In December 1993, a range of 1 to 3 percent was established for 1994
onwards.
In Table 1 we compare adoption dates among ﬁve diﬀerent studies and provide our two
possible adoption dates. Column “Class. 1” refers to the soft IT adoption dates while “Class.
2” accounts for fully-ﬂedged IT adoption. In 6 cases we have more than a three-year diﬀerence
16 We also perform estimations with diﬀerent samples for the non-ITers observations. See the Appendix.
17 This information is available from the various central bank’s web sites.
18 See Fraga et al. (2003) for a comprehensive survey of IT in developing countries.
9Table 1: Inﬂation targeters and dates of adoption (a)
Corbo Fracasso Fraga Levin P´ etursson Ball & Class. Class.
et al. et al. et al. et al. (2004) Sheridan 1 2
(2002) (2003) (2003) (2004) (2004) (b) (b)
Australia 1994 1994 1993 1993 1994 1994 1994
Brazil 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999
Canada 1991 1991 1991 1991 1992(94) 1991 1994
Chile 1991 1991 1991 1991 1990 1991 1999
Colombia 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1995 1999
Czech Republic 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998
Finland (c) 1993 1994 1993 1993
Hungary 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Iceland 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Israel 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1997
Mexico 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1995 1999
New Zealand 1990 1988 1990 1990 1990(93) 1990 1991
Norway 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Peru 1994 2002 1994 2002 2002 1994 2002
Philippines 2002 2002 1995 2002
Poland 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998
South Africa 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
South Korea 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998
Spain (c) 1995 1994(95) 1994 1995
Sweden 1993 1993 1993 1993 1995 1993 1995
Switzerland 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Thailand 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
United Kingdom 1992 1992 1992 1992 1993 1992 1992
(a) Blank cells mean the authors did not provide a clear reference of the date of IT adoption.
(b) Our classiﬁcations come from each central bank’s webpage. See the main text for details.
(c) Finland and Spain abandoned inﬂation targeting and adopted the Euro in 1999.
between both dates: Chile (8 years), Colombia (4 years), Israel (5 years), Mexico (4 years),
Peru (8 years) and Philippines (7 years). In others, such as Australia and the UK, both
classiﬁcations coincide.
3.2 Inﬂation outcomes
One shortcoming of working with a wide control group is low availability of data. Even though
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) time series are readily available for most of the countries,
this is not true with some interesting variables. Such is the case for inﬂation expectations
10(from surveys) or forecasts errors (from polls) that are directly inﬂuenced by IT adoption19
or cross-sectional higher moments (skewness and kurtosis) of the CPI distribution.
Hence, the outcomes we use are quantities that can be extracted from conventional CPI
data that broadly characterize inﬂation dynamics: level, variation and persistence. We built
a yearly dataset from quarterly CPI information from the IMF’s database (IFS), compute
the counterfactuals and ﬁnd the treatment eﬀect on a country basis20. The average over time
and ITers from ˆ ξi,t in equation (7) is the estimate of interest21. For each year t the level of
inﬂation is deﬁned as the mean of the annualized quarterly inﬂation rates of years t and t−1.
The same logic applies to the standard deviation of inﬂation.
The interesting debate on measuring inﬂation persistence22 can be summarized in the equation
πt − µt = ρ(πt−1 − µt−1) +
p X
j=1
βj∆(πt−j − µt−j) + t (8)
that is a reparameterization of a simple AR(p) process for (πt − µt), the deviation of
inﬂation (πt) from its mean (µt). A common practice is to set µt = µ and estimate the
parameter ρ, which equals the sum of all the autoregressive coeﬃcients in the original AR(p)
representation23. The closer is ρ to one, the more persistent the inﬂation.
However, Robalo Marques (2004) has pointed out that if the true process in (8) has a time-
varying mean, imposing µt = µ leads to misleading conclusions. Particularly ρ will capture
two eﬀects: persistence and mean-reversion, so it is possible to obtain a ρ close to one with a
series that is not persistent at all. To control for this undesirable eﬀect, he suggests, within
a univariate framework, to estimate µt as a smooth trend of πt. Considering this, we use two
measures of inﬂation persistence: the estimated ρ with µt = µ and with µt approximated by
the HP ﬁlter24. To compute these quantities we use rolling windows with between 10 and 15
years of quarterly data25.
19 See Johnson (2002) for an application to a sample of selected countries.
20 As a baseline we consider the pre-treatment period to be 5 years before the IT adoption (k in equation
(7)). We also tried diﬀerent deﬁnitions, though the results were not sensitive to this assumption.
21 It is important to note that the number of years after IT varies as IT adoption dates do. For Classiﬁcation
1 [2] there are 175 [132] post-IT observations.
22 See Robalo Marques (2004) for a survey. This author also shows that the approach followed here to measure
persistence, even tough having some limitations, seems to the most reliable among simple alternatives.
23 It is well known that the OLS estimator of ρ is biased when ρ ' 1. An alternative (and popular) estimator,
that is adopted here, is proposed in Andrews and Chen (2004).
24 We use a smoothing parameter of λ = 1600. Diﬀerent choices of λ do not qualitatively change the results.
25 The lag length in (8), p, was selected to minimize the Schwartz criterion.
114 Results
In Table 2 we present the estimated average eﬀects of IT for all ITers, for the group of
industrialized countries as well as developing ones. We report eﬀects on inﬂation dynamics
according to our two alternative classiﬁcations of IT adoption. In the spirit of the mean-
regression hypothesis of Ball and Sheridan (2005), we also include the results obtained by
controlling for initial (pre-treatment) conditions26.
The ﬁrst key result is that IT has signiﬁcantly reduced mean inﬂation in all the cases. In
general we ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of soft IT adoption are stronger than those of fully-ﬂedge
IT adoption. This was expected due to high-inﬂation countries adopting IT to stabilize (the
dates in Classiﬁcation 1). Also, the beneﬁts on developing countries have been signiﬁcantly
stronger than those on industrialized ones, which conﬁrms previous ﬁndings in Bernanke et
al. (1999), Corbo et al. (2002), Neumann and Von Hagen (2002) and P´ etursson (2004). The
results also suggest that regression to the mean is indeed an important phenomenon, since the
eﬀects of IT tend to be smaller once we control for initial conditions. However, by considering
a substantially wider treatment and control groups than the ones in Ball and Sheridan (2005),
we ﬁnd that there is no suﬃcient evidence to discard the beneﬁts of IT: IT matters for mean
inﬂation in both industrial and developing countries alike.
As mentioned in Faust and Henderson (2004), “Common wisdom and conventional models
suggest that best-practice policy can be summarized in terms of two goals: ﬁrst, get mean
inﬂation right; second, get the variance of inﬂation right”. Our ﬁnding regarding mean
inﬂation supports the idea that IT in fact helps achieving the ﬁrst goal. What about the
second goal? During the period of analysis, inﬂation has been falling worldwide, and together,
the variance of inﬂation has been decreasing everywhere as well27. Our second ﬁnding precisely
points that the observed fall in the variance of inﬂation has been particularly strong within
ITers, such that the treatment eﬀect has been that of a marked reduction in variance. The
pattern of this eﬀect across country groups and IT classiﬁcations is similar to the one found
for the level of inﬂation. Neumann and Von Hagen (2002) and Corbo et al. (2002) also provide
evidence suggesting that IT has contributed to the fall in inﬂation volatility28.
What can we say about IT eﬀects on inﬂation persistence? As mentioned, there is no a
straightforward theoretical prediction of the eﬀects of IT on persistence. Adoption of IT can
be linked to either lower or higher inﬂation persistence, it all hinges on two opposing eﬀects:
26 That is, using the notation of section 2, the ﬁrst group of estimates are the treatment eﬀects on Yi,t −Yi,t0
whereas the second are the treatment eﬀects on the residuals of the regression Yi,t−Yi,t0 = α+βYi,t0 +ei,t.
27 See P´ etursson (2004).
28 Johnson (2002) and Ball and Sheridan (2005) suggest that IT increases inﬂation uncertainty. The ﬁnding in
Johnson (2002) in fact refers to volatility of expected inﬂation from surveys, a variable related to observed
inﬂation volatility but with a dynamics of its own.
12Table 2: Average treatment eﬀect of Inﬂation Targeting (a)
All Industrialized Developing
ITers countries countries
Classiﬁcation 1 Difference in means
Level –4.802 (0.440) –3.335 (0.627) –6.320 (0.631)
Standard Deviation –2.099 (0.323) –1.546 (0.468) –2.671 (0.452)
Persistence (µt = µ) 0.027 (0.042) 0.031 (0.068) 0.024 (0.050)
Persistence (µt = HP) –0.028 (0.026) –0.092 (0.023) –0.039 (0.011)
Classiﬁcation 2 Difference in means
Level –2.863 (0.235) –1.327 (0.334) –5.382 (0.297)
Standard Deviation –1.551 (0.318) –1.103 (0.386) –2.286 (0.557)
Persistence (µt = µ) 0.027 (0.032) 0.003 (0.047) 0.066 (0.036)
Persistence (µt = HP) –0.016 (0.024) –0.061 (0.018) –0.058 (0.012)
Classiﬁcation 1 Regression, controls for initial conditions
Level –3.874 (0.745) –2.804 (0.868) –4.907 (1.269)
Standard Deviation –1.863 (0.413) –0.988 (0.568) –2.708 (0.657)
Persistence (µt = µ) 0.030 (0.039) 0.012 (0.057) 0.049 (0.058)
Persistence (µt = HP) –0.015 (0.031) –0.006 (0.022) –0.023 (0.024)
Classiﬁcation 2 Regression, controls for initial conditions
Level –2.621 (0.312) –1.603 (0.421) –3.242 (0.337)
Standard Deviation –1.798 (0.308) –1.284 (0.383) –2.112 (0.478)
Persistence (µt = µ) 0.043 (0.023) 0.012 (0.035) 0.094 (0.035)
Persistence (µt = HP) –0.047 (0.021) –0.033 (0.016) –0.055 (0.016)
(a) Figures in parenthesis are bootstrapped standard errors (5000 replications).
how fast central banks allow inﬂation to revert back to its mean after a shock and how price
formation changes if expectations become more anchored. Studies like Levin et al. (2004) show
that persistence is lower in ITers than that in non-ITers whereas Ball and Sheridan (2005)
show there is no evidence that ITers achieve lower inﬂation persistence29.
We ﬁnd that the results depend on the measure of persistence (ρ) used. If we consider a
constant unconditional mean in the inﬂation process (µt = µ) we ﬁnd that IT increases
persistence, though the estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant and diﬀerent from zero.
29 Time series studies on persistence for industrial countries like Benati (2004), Levin and Piger (2004) or
Robalo Marques (2004) point to the conclusion that high inﬂation persistence is not a robust feature of
inﬂation processes in the euro-area.
13Contrary, if we allow for a time varying mean inﬂation (µt = HP) we ﬁnd that IT does
reduce the persistence parameter. Interestingly, some sort of mean-regression is present under
Classiﬁcation 1 (soft IT): once we control for the initial persistence, the fall in ρ disappears.
However, under Classiﬁcation 2 (fully-ﬂedged IT) the fall in ρ is signiﬁcant even after
controlling for mean-regression (which seem to exist in industrialized economies).
This last eﬀect, although diﬀerent from zero, is at most modest. The half life of a shock to
inﬂation is, roughly speaking, τ ≈ −ln(2)/ln(ρ)30. The changes in ρ implied by our results
varies around –0.04; hence, considering an initial ρ = 0.8531 the change in τ is just one quarter.
All in all, the evidence on the eﬀect of IT on inﬂation persistence, if any, is not as categorical
as the one associated with the mean and volatility reduction.
5 Concluding Remarks
The increasing popularity of IT as a framework for conducting monetary policy claims for
the evaluation of its beneﬁts in comparison to alternative schemes. In this study we have
combined data of IT adoption and inﬂation dynamics with program evaluation techniques to
assess the dimensions in which IT is a beneﬁcial regime. Our central ﬁndings support the idea
that the adoption of IT, either in its soft or explicit form, delivers the theoretically promised
outcomes: low mean inﬂation (around a ﬁxed target or within a target range) and low inﬂation
volatility.
We also ﬁnd that IT has reduced the persistence of inﬂation in developing countries. Given
that IT is understood to be ﬂexible, the reduction in persistence is likely to be the eﬀect of
the anchoring of expectations to a deﬁned nominal level. Nevertheless, the small magnitude
of the reduction is such that it prevents us to conclude in favor of IT in this particular
dimension of the inﬂation dynamics. In the future, it would be useful to contrast our results
with alternative measures of persistence. Also, a promising area for further research is to
formalize the theoretical link between IT, inﬂation persistence and long-run expectations
(credibility), which can guide subsequent empirical eﬀorts.
The interpretation we gave to IT adoption, that of a natural experiment, allowed us to use
powerful evaluation tools normally applied in microeconometrics, where the odds to identify
policy eﬀects are by far higher than in macroeconomics. We also reckon that the study of
the response of other macroeconomic variables (for instance, the business cycles and interest
rates) to IT is essential in order to have a complete appraisal of the eﬀects if the IT regime.
Hence future research can explore further, within the IT adoption evaluation, the advantages
of these techniques on a wider variety of macro indicators.
30 This formula is exact if the estimated model is an AR(1).
31 This is a generous value. The sample mean of all our computed ρ after de-trending is just below 0.50.
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16A Appendix: Propensity score estimations
We present some details on the propensity score estimations under various deﬁnitions of IT adoption
dates. It is important to recall that the role of the propensity score is to reduce the dimensionality of
the matching, it does not necessarily convey a behavioral interpretation. Indeed, the logit regressions
below do not seek to ﬁnd the determinants that made a central bank adopt an IT regime, but to
characterize and summarize the economic state in which the ITers began to implement the regime.
The diﬀerence is subtle but allows us to control for variables that although are useful to deﬁne the
proﬁle of a particular economy (importantly, relatively to others), are not theoretically included in
the central bank’s decision to change the monetary policy regime32.
We built a yearly dataset for 109 countries containing a set of variables that broadly deﬁne an
economy. The sources were the Penn World Table (PWT version 6.0) for GDP per capita and
national accounts data, the IFS for international reserves, money and credit markets data, Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ (2004) for exchange rate regime, the World Bank for social indicators and other sources
for central bank staﬀ and geographical controls.
The variables entered in the regression are the averages of the ﬁve years previous to the IT adoption
for ITers. To check for robustness, for non-ITers we use either the average since 1990 up to 2004 or
the 5 years previous to 1996 (for Classiﬁcation 1) or 1998 (for Classiﬁcation 2)33. As described in
the text, we tested for the balancing hypothesis and selected the most parsimonious speciﬁcation.
Table 3: Propensity score estimation, logit regressions (a)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Classiﬁcation for ITers Class. 1 Class. 2 Class. 1 Class. 2
Classiﬁcation for non-ITers > 1990 > 1990 Class. 1 Class. 2
Investment to GDP 0.337 (0.099) 0.250 (0.073) 0.402 (0.111) 0.282 (0.076)
Openness ratio –0.057 (0.012) –0.042 (0.013) –0.010 (0.027) –0.065 (0.019)
Share of world GDP –0.591 (0.199) –0.342 (0.161) –0.712 (0.313) –0.437 (0.244)
Fiscal balance to GDP 0.291 (0.166) 0.147 (0.103) 0.325 (0.150) 0.159 (0.120)
CPI Inﬂation 0.428 (0.133) 0.254 (0.099) 0.351 (0.126) 0.242 (0.097)
Inﬂation volatility –5.206 (1.926) –3.599 (1.543) –4.523 (1.957) –2.929 (1.752)
Money to GDP 0.033 (0.015) 0.027 (0.013) 0.051 (0.021) 0.028 (0.015)
Exchange rate regime –0.232 (0.079) –0.154 (0.061) –0.207 (0.079) –0.141 (0.055)
Observations 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R2 0.6114 0.4704 0.6066 0.4940
LR stat, χ2(8) 65.95 50.74 65.43 53.28
Common support region [0.036, 0.998] [0.037, 0.994] [0.030, 0.993] [0.015, 0.995]
non-ITers in common support 28 31 30 43
(a) Figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors.
32 See Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) for an attempt to interpret a cross sectional logit of the IT adoption
in behavioral terms.
33 These are the average adoption dates in each classiﬁcation.
17In Table 3 above we show the variables whose coeﬃcients were statistically signiﬁcant in the four
estimated models: from the PWT, Investment to GDP, exports plus imports to GDP (namely,
openness ratio) and the share of world GDP (GDP for a particular country to the sum of GDPs
of the 109 countries in the database); from the IFS, the ﬁscal balance to GDP, inﬂation and its
coeﬃcient of variation (inﬂation volatility) and the money to GDP ratio; ﬁnally, the average number
of years that a country was classiﬁed as freely ﬂoating by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004).
In Figure 1 we present the density of the propensity score for ITers and non-ITers derived for each
of the estimated models. It can be seen that the densities for model (1) are close to those of model
(3); similarly, model (4) resembles (2). For this reason, we work with the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations
in the text, where the diﬀerences between the propensities scores are driven by the alternative IT
adoptions dates, and not by variations in the control group.
Figure 1: Propensity score densities by IT adoption date

























 (1) ITers, Class. 1; non−ITers, > 1990
ITers: 23; non−ITers: 28
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
 (2) ITers, Class. 2; non−ITers, > 1990
ITers: 23; non−ITers: 31


























 (3) ITers, Class. 1; non−ITers, Class. 1
ITers: 23; non−ITers: 30
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Estimated propensity score
 (4) ITers, Class. 2; non−ITers, Class 2.
ITers: 23; non−ITers: 43
non−ITers
ITers
18